Why do some countries grow much faster, and have much better trade performance, than other countries? What are the crucial factors behind such differences, and what can governments do in order to improve the relative position of their economies? This paper outlines a synthetic framework, based on Schumpeterian logic, for analysing such questions. Four different aspects of competitiveness are identified; technology, capacity, costs and demand. The framework is applied to a sample of 100 countries between 1993 and 2002. JEL: E11, F43, O30.
Introduction

1
Why do some countries grow so much faster, and have much better trade performance, than other countries? What are the crucial factors behind such differences? Which policies can governments pursue to improve the relative performance of their economies (and welfare of its citizens)? These are the kind of questions that motivate a concern for the competitiveness of countries. Although the concept as such has been strongly criticized by some theoreticians, the importance of the underlying challenges makes it unlikely that this issue will lose the attention of policy makers soon.
2
The concept "the international competitiveness of a country" is a relative term. What is of interest is not absolute performance, however that may be defined, but how well a country does relative to others. Furthermore, the concept usually has a double meaning, it relates both to the economic well-being of its citizens, normally measured through GDP per capita, and the trade performance of the country.
3
The underlying assumption, then, is that these things are intimately related. In the next section we outline an analytical framework, based on Schumpeterian logic, which among other things explains why, in analyses of competitiveness, it is indeed natural to focus on both GDP and trade performance and their mutual relationship.
Arguably, the discussion of the competitiveness issue has been much obscured by a common tendency among many economists to focus on extremely simplified representations of reality that abstracts from the very facts that make competitiveness an important issue for policy makers and other stakeholders in a country. A well-known example of this is the idea of "perfect competition", which among other things presupposes that all agents have access to the same body of knowledge, produce goods of identical quality and sell these in price-clearing markets, so that the only thing left to care about is to get the price right. For a long time this led applied economists and analysts to focus on price as the only aspect of competitiveness. Joseph Schumpeter long ago described the shortcomings of such simplifications. The true nature of capitalist competition, he argued, is not price competition, as envisaged in traditional textbooks, but technological competition:
"But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that kind of competition that counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (…) -competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives." (see Schumpeter 1943, p. 84) .
In this paper we depart from the "perfect competition" approach and the idea of technology as a public good. Rather, following Dosi (1988) and others, we assume that technology is cumulative and context dependent in ways that prevent the economic benefits of innovation to spread more or less automatically. However, this does not prevent diffusion from being a powerful factor behind growth and competitiveness in so-called latecomer countries (see Fagerberg and Godinho 2004) . We side with the economic historian Gerschenkron (1962) in his suggestion that the technological gap between a frontier and a latecomer country represents "a great promise" for the latter, since it provides the latecomer with the opportunity of imitating more advanced technology in use elsewhere. But just as he and others have done, we stress the stringent requirements for getting the most out of such opportunities (see Abramovitz 1986 and . We use the term "capacity competitiveness" for this aspect of the competitiveness of a country, which we suggest be considered in addition to the two other aspects -technology and price competitiveness -mentioned above. Finally, following one of the suggestions in the literature on competitiveness (see the next section), we also take into account the ability of a country to exploit the changing composition of demand, by offering attractive products that are in high demand at home and abroad.
We label this (fourth) aspect "demand competitiveness".
A synthetic framework
We start by developing a very simple growth model based on Schumpeterian logic, which we will subsequently extend and refine. Assume that the GDP of a country (Y) is a multiplicative function of its technological knowledge (Q) and its capacity for exploiting the benefits of knowledge (C), and a constant (A 1 ):
Its technological knowledge, in turn, is assumed to be a multiplicative function of knowledge diffused to the region from outside (D) and knowledge (or innovation) created in the country (N) and, again, a constant (A 2 ):
Assume further, as common in the literature, that the diffusion of external knowledge follows a logistic curve. This implies that the contribution of diffusion of externally available knowledge to economic growth is an increasing function of the distance between the level of knowledge appropriated in the country and that of the country on the technological frontier (for the frontier country, this contribution will be zero by definition). Let the total amount of knowledge, adjusted for differences in size of countries, in the frontier country and the country under consideration, be T * and T, respectively:
Instead of seeing the model (1)-(6) as a model of GDP growth, one might consider it as a model of GDP per capita (worker) growth, in which case all variables would enter on a per capita (worker) basis. The first application of the model was based on the former assumption, applied here, while later applications, for instance on regional growth, have generally assumed the latter. The relationship between the two versions of the model is straightforward. Note, however, that if the latter assumption is chosen, population (or labour force) growth would enter into the determination of GDP growth.
By differentiating (2), using small case letters for growth rates, and substituting (3) into it, we arrive at the following expression for the growth of a country's technological knowledge: Since our primary interest is in "why growth differs" it may be useful to express the rate of growth of the country in relative terms (growth relative to the world average), :
Hence, following this perspective the rate of growth of a country may be seen as the outcome of three sets of factors:
• The potential for exploiting knowledge developed elsewhere;
• Creation of new knowledge in the country (innovation);
• Growth in the capacity to exploit the potential entailed by knowledge (independently of where it is created).
This model, simple as it is, encompasses many of the empirical models found in the literature. For instance, the empirical models used in the "catching-up" literature can be seen as a version of (5)-(6) in which the innovation term is ignored (See, for example, Baumol 1989 ). Fagerberg applied the above model to a sample of developed and medium income countries. It was shown that countries that caught up very fast also had very rapid growth of innovative activity. The analysis suggested that superior growth in innovative activity was the prime factor behind the huge difference in performance between Asian and Latin American NICs in the 1970s and early 1980s (see Fagerberg 1988a ). It has also been shown that the continuing rapid growth of the Asian NICs relative to other country groupings in the decade that followed was primarily caused by the rapid increases in its innovative performance (see Fagerberg and Verspagen 2002) . Moreover, estimations of the model for different time periods indicate that while imitation has become more demanding over time (and hence more costly to undertake), innovation has become a more powerful factor in explaining observed differences in growth performance (see Fagerberg 1987 and Verspagen 2002) .
The model opens up for international technology flows but abstracts from flows of goods and services. We will now introduce the latter. For simplicity we do this in a two country framework, in which the other country is labelled "world". Define the share of a country's exports (X) in world demand (W) as S x = X / W , and similarly the share of imports (M) in its own GDP (Y) as S m = M /Y . For the sake of exposition we assume that the market shares of a country are unaffected by the growth of the market, but we will relax this assumption later. Following the Schumpeterian logic outlined in the previous section, we will assume that, apart from a constant term, a country's market share for exports depends on three factors: its technological competitiveness (its knowledge assets relative to competitors); its capacity to exploit 5 This is based on the assumption that the two countries face the same competitive conditions (elasticities) but vary in other respects. technology commercially (again relative to competitors); and its price (P) competitiveness (relative prices on tradeables in common currency):
Since, by definition, imports in this model are "world" exports, we may model the import share in the same way, using bars to distinguish the coefficients of the two equations:
By differentiating (7) and substituting (4) into it, and similarly for (8), we arrive at the dynamic expressions for the growth in market shares:
We see that the growth of the market share of a country depends on four factors:
• The potential for exploiting knowledge developed elsewhere, which depends on the country's level of technological development relative to the world average;
• Creation of new knowledge (technology) in the country (innovation) relative to that of competitors;
• Growth in the capacity to exploit knowledge, independently of where it is created, relative to that of competitors;
• Change in relative prices in common currency.
Following earlier contributions by Thirlwall and Fagerberg we now introduce the requirement that trade in goods and services has to balance (if not in the short run, than in the long -see Thirlwall 1979 and Fagerberg 1988b) . Countries may, however, have foreign debts (or assets). As is easily verified, we may multiply the left or right hand side of (11) with a scalar without any consequence for the subsequent deductions. Hence an alternative way to formulate this restriction might be that the deficit (surplus) used to service foreign debt (derived from assets abroad) should be a constant fraction of exports (or imports):
By differentiating (11), substituting S X and S M into it and rearranging we arrive at the dynamic form of the restriction:
This assumption has been extensively tested on data for developed economies and found to hold well (see Fagerberg 1988b and Meliciani 2001) .
By substituting (9)-(10) into (12) and rearranging we get the reduced form of the model:
By comparing this equation with the similar reduced form of the growth model (6) we see that, apart from the last term on the right hand side, the model has the same structure. The only difference is that the coefficients of the basic growth equation now are shown to be sums of coefficients for the similar variables in the market-share equations (for the domestic and world market). Hence, the sensitivity of the markets (or "selection environments") for new technologies clearly matters for growth. The final term is the familiar Marshall-Lerner condition, which states that the sum of the price elasticities for exports and imports (when measured in absolute value) has to be higher than one if deteriorating price competitiveness is going to harm the external balance (and -in this case -the rate of growth of GDP).
We have modelled the market share equations on the assumption that, when not only price, but also technology and capacity have been taken into account as competitive factors, demand may be assumed to have a unitary elasticity. This means, for instance, abstracting from other factors, that if export demand grows by a certain percentage, exports will do the same, so that the market share remains unaffected. However, there are reasons to believe that this assumption, although appealing in its simplicity, does not necessarily hold in reality. For instance, it has been argued that if a country has a pattern of specialization geared towards industries that are in high (low) demand internationally its exports may grow faster (slower) than world demand, quite independently of what happens to other factors (see Thirlwall 1979 and Kaldor 1981) . This way of reasoning, distinctly Keynesian in flavour, places more emphasis on the growth of world demand, and on the "income elasticities of demand" for a country's exports and imports in determining a country's growth performance.
6
The higher the income elasticity of exports relative to that of imports, it is argued, the higher the rate of growth will be, and vice versa. Arguably, this might be expected to be of greatest relevance for small countries, since these are likely to be more specialized in their economic (and trade) structure than large ones. To take this possibility into account we, following Fagerberg, introduce demand in the market shares equations (see Fagerberg 1988b):
By differentiating and substituting we arrive at the following expression for the reduced form:
The first thing to note is that the higher the demand elasticity for imports, the lower the effect on growth of all other factors. The second is, as before, that while the first three terms on the right hand side resemble the basic growth model (6), the two last terms in (13') resemble the model suggested by Thirlwall (1979) . Hence, both the basic model (6) and Thirlwall's model can be seen as special cases of a more general "Schumpeterian" open economy model.
The income elasticity of exports is the growth in exports resulting from a 1 per cent increase in world demand, holding relative prices constant (and ignoring cyclical factors). It is similar for imports.
7
If the demand elasticities are the same in both markets and the Marshall-Learner condition is exactly satisfied (or relative prices do not change), the two last terms vanish, and we are back in a model that for all practical purposes is identical to (6). If, on the other hand, the country's technological level is exactly average 2.3 The competitiveness of the countries 1993-2002: the "stylized facts" Fagerberg (1987 Fagerberg ( , 1988b applied the above open economy model to data for developed (OECD) economies between 1960 and 1983. The results generally confirmed the importance of growth in technological and capacity competitiveness. The impact of price or cost factors was found to be relatively marginal, consistent with the earlier findings by Kaldor (the so-called Kaldor paradox).
8
More recently, Meliciani (2001) has applied a similar model to a longer time series, including a more recent time period, with broadly similar results.
9
In this paper we move beyond these previous empirical applications of this perspective. First we consider a much broader sample, 100 countries, characterized by very different development levels and trends, for a more recent (though shorter) time span (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . The sample consists of all countries for which data were available (see annex). Second, we develop much more sophisticated indicators of the various aspects that together determine the overall competitiveness of a country. This is particularly the case for "technology competitiveness" and "capacity competitiveness", both of which are multidimensional in character and consequently hard to measure. But we also develop a new indicator of "demand competitiveness" that in a better way captures the underlying ideas behind the inclusion of this particular dimension.
Figure1 presents some basic data on development levels and trends for the countries included in our investigation. While the vertical axis measures average productivity or income over the period (GDP per capita in PPPs in 1993), the horizontal axis reports annual average growth over the period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . By combining these two aspects, level and trend, four different quadrants emerge. First, to the upper left we have countries with above average level of GDP per capita but relatively slow growth, i.e. countries that "lose momentum". Japan, Switzerland and Germany are the prime examples. In contrast, in the upper left quadrant, we have countries that continue to grow fast despite a high level of GDP per capita ("moving ahead"). The most spectacular example is Ireland; other countries included in this more dynamic category are Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Luxembourg. Most of the "new EU members" (the countries that joined the EU in 2004) also grow faster than the average. However, most developed countries cluster on the borderline between "losing momentum" and "moving ahead", indicating a growth performance close to the average of the sample. and both relative technology and relative capacity keep constant, the three first terms vanish, and only Thirlwall's model remains.
8
Kaldor showed for a number of countries that over the long term market shares for exports and relative unit costs or prices tend to move together, i.e. that growing market shares and increasing relative costs or prices tend to go hand in hand -see Kaldor (1978) . This was, of course, the opposite of what you would expect from the simplistic though at the time widely diffused approach focusing exclusively on the (assumedly negative) impact of increasing relative costs or prices on market shares, hence the term "paradox". Fagerberg (1988b) has shown that this finding also applies to a more recent time period.
9
Meliciani (2001) also added a "specialization" variable, reflecting the extent to which countries were specialized in technologically progressive sectors, to the market share equations, for which she found empirical support. Of particular interest is the performance of the poorer economies, those in the lower half of the graph. Here we see a very clear distinction between those that are "catching up" (in the lower right) and those that are "falling further behind" (in the lower left). The former, those that appear to be on a "catching up" trajectory, include some developing countries in Asia, notably China, and some African and Latin-American countries as well. In sharp contrast to this favourable development, many of the countries in our sample that formerly belonged to the so-called centrally planned economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union continue to fall further behind. This unfavourable performance is shared with many of the African and Latin American countries included in our sample.
Clearly there is a lot of diversity in how countries perform. Although in each and every case there will be specific factors at work these will not be in focus here. Rather we will attempt, in a better way than in previous analyses, to single out some general factors that may be of interest when discussing the wide differences across countries in economic performance. These are:
• Technology competitiveness;
• Capacity competitiveness;
• Cost competitiveness;
• Demand competitiveness.
Of these the two former are clearly multi-dimensional and therefore more difficult to handle. Our approach here will be to identify the most important dimensions, find reliable indicators, express these in a comparable format and weigh them together, using principal component analysis to determine the weights used in the calculation of the composite indicator.
10 A complete list with definitions and sources for the indicators used is given in the annex. In some cases, missing data had to be estimated. Whenever possible, indicators are defined as activities measured in quantity or constant prices, deflated by population. We standardized the indicators before aggregating them in the composites as follows: (14) deviation standard value mean value actual −
We used the same mean and standard deviation for the initial and final year (derived from pooled data for both periods). This means that changes over time in the volume of the activities measured by the individual indicators were allowed to spill over to the composite indicator (along with the changes caused by shifts in the position of countries on each individual indicator). For instance, in the early 1990s ICT diffusion was still at a relatively low level. Today ICT technologies are very widely used and are, arguably, of much higher importance to competitiveness than they were a decade ago. The way we calculate the capacity indicator is consistent with this.
(i) Technology competitiveness
Technology (or technological) competitiveness refers to the ability to compete successfully in markets for new goods and services. Hence, this type of competitiveness is closely related to the innovativeness of a country. There is, however, no available data source which measures innovativeness directly. Instead what we have are different data sources reflecting different aspects of the phenomenon. R&D expenditures, for instance, measure some (but not all) of the resources that go into developing new goods and services. Patent statistics, on the other hand, measure the output of (patentable) inventions. This is a very reliable data source, but the propensity to patent varies considerably across industries, and many innovations are not patentable. So many innovations would not be accounted for by using this indicator only. Taking into account both indicators clearly gives a more balanced picture. To further increase the reliability of the composite indicator we also include a measure of the quality of the science base on which innovation activities depend as reflected in articles published in scientific and technical journals.
10 It would of course have been preferable to have prior knowledge about the "true weights" to use. Having no such information, we either had to give each variable an equal weight, or estimate the weights with the help of principal component analysis. In this paper we chose the latter, but it may be noted that the weights thus obtained were not far from equal weights (see annex Table A2 ). For an extended discussion, see European Commission (2002) and Freudenberg (2003) . In Figure 2 the level and trend in technology competitiveness are plotted against each other. When compared with the case of overall competitiveness in Figure 1 , the indicator for technological competitiveness displays a much stronger tendency towards divergence. As a general rule, countries either move ahead of the others or fall further behind, with only a few staying in the middle. Among the countries that move ahead technologically, Taiwan, Finland, Singapore, Israel and Sweden are most prominent, but many more developed countries also fit this category. Those falling further behind include most of the former centrally planned economies and the developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
(ii) Capacity competitiveness
In many respects the distinction between technology competitiveness and capacity competitiveness is crucial. For instance, Sony did not develop the transistor, but showed a superior capacity to United States firms when it came to exploiting this new technology in a way that sustained competitiveness. In fact, many of the inroads of Japanese producers on Western markets during most of the post-war period were of this kind. Although the distinction may be clear enough in theory, in practice it may not be all that simple, since resources that are devoted to developing new goods and services may also be beneficial for the ability to exploit such innovations economically and vice versa (see Cohen and Levinthal 1990) . Regarding capacity competitiveness, we will focus on three dimensions; human capital, technology diffusion and broader social and institutional aspects. The importance of a well-developed human capital base for exploiting technological opportunities goes without saying; here we focus on secondary and tertiary education (as reflected in gross enrolment rates) in particular. Technology diffusion is captured by including gross fixed capital formation (a measure new technology embodied in machinery and equipment) and, in addition, the spread of computers across the population, since a well-developed ICT infrastructure is generally acknowledged as critical for the ability to benefit from new technology these days. Finally, we acknowledge that there may be a number of social and institutional factors of importance for the capacity to exploit technological opportunity. Although such factors often defy measurement, at least on a broad crosscountry/cross-temporal basis, there exist survey data on factors such as the quality of governance and adherence to human rights across countries, which might be relevant to consider. Figure 3 , which plots the level and trend of capacity competitiveness against each other, confirms that many developed countries, joined by the new EU member countries and the Asian tigers, have high and growing capacity for exploiting new technology. Among the most dynamic we find Sweden, Korea, Ireland and Luxembourg. This contrasts with the position of the countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union, which generally experienced declining levels of capacity competitiveness during this period. The same holds for most developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Still, while technological competitiveness displays strong signs of divergence, there is a bit more convergence going on in the capacity to exploit technological opportunity, since some developing countries (Croatia, Chile and Brazil, in particular) catch up at a relatively fast rate.
(iii) Price competitiveness
In one sense price or cost competitiveness should be the easiest dimension to identify. In fact, for a long time economists focused only on price or cost competitiveness, and a well defined indicatorunit labour costs in manufacturing in a common currency -was readily available. We, however, found that indicator to be one of the most problematic in terms of data coverage. The estimates of price or cost competitiveness presented here are based on several sources and considerable judgement had to be made in order to improve the coverage (see the annex for further details). Figure 4 plots the growth of price competitiveness (unit labour costs in manufacturing in in US dollars) on the horizontal axis against growth of overall competitiveness (GDP per capita) on the vertical. The relationship has the usual negative form, which means that on average the higher the growth of price competitiveness, the lower the rate of growth, and vice versa. This, obviously, concurs with the traditional view on competitiveness, which focuses mainly on the damaging effects of excessive wage growth on the economy. Note, however, that this observation depends to some extent on a few extreme cases (Ukraine, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan on the one hand, and China and Ireland on the other). 
(iv) Demand competitiveness
The relationship between a country production (or trade) structure and the composition of world demand may also be of importance for competitiveness. The better the match, the more favourably the country's economy should develop, and vice versa. We capture this aspect by weighting the growth of world demand (by commodity) by the commodity composition of each country's exports:
where w is the share of product group in country j exports in the base year, g is the growth of the export market, i is the product group and T is the market total. Figure 5 plots the relationship between demand competitiveness (horizontal axis), and growth of GDP per capita (vertical axis).
11 Those that appear to have gained most from the composition of demand were in particular Malta, Singapore and Ireland, joined by many developed countries, while countries from the developing world, especially African ones, were the least favourably affected. 
Global competitiveness: Exploring the dynamics
Having developed empirical indicators of the different aspects of competitiveness, we will apply these indicators in an analysis of the differing growth performance of the countries. However, the short time period for which (reliable) data are available (especially for many of the former centrally planned economies) puts severe limits on the possibilities for econometric work. We therefore refrained from estimating the entire model, and chose instead to concentrate on its reduced form, as given by equation (13'), according to which the rate of economic growth of a country should be a weighted sum of:
• The potential for diffusion;
• Growth in technological competitiveness;
• Growth in capacity competitiveness;
• Growth in cost competitiveness;
• Demand competitiveness, all relative to that of other countries.
The main purpose of the estimation, then, is to estimate these weights, which in turn will be used to assess the impact of the different aspects of competitiveness on economic growth. To calculate the potential for diffusion we use, as in previous empirical applications based on this perspective, a ratio of the level of GDP per capita in the leader country (the United States) and the country in question (log-form). For the other four variables we used the indicators developed in the previous section. However, the normalization procedure used in creating the indicators of technology and capacity competitiveness made it difficult to calculate growth rates, so we substituted the growth-rates with differences in the level of these variables between the final and the initial year. Table 1 presents the results of the regression analysis. The coefficients for the five variables included in the model all have the expected signs, significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent or 10 per cent level.
12 The explanatory value is high, around 40 per cent. Since the analysis suggested that some countries had to be considered as outliers, we re-estimated the model without these outliers (second column). This increased the explanatory power somewhat, but had little impact on the estimated impact of the variables of the model. To explore possible differences across samples, we reestimated the model for the low income countries only (third column). Interestingly, increases in technology competitiveness turn out to be much more important in low-income countries than for the sample as a whole, and the same holds to some extent for price competitiveness. So even if developing countries generally innovate less than the developed ones, developing countries that do innovate apparently profit a lot from it. Columns four and five report similar estimates for progressively larger samples (by adding countries depending on income bracket). As might be expected, as the size of the sample increases, the differences in results, relative to those of the sample as a whole, decrease. parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels (two-tailed tests). Dependent variable is difference between average annual GDP growth of a country and world average as defined in equation (13'). Independent variables are on a common basis (standardized -see equation 14) to allow direct parameter's value comparability. Column (2) reports result without main outliers (Cook's distance in brackets, sample mean = 0.010): Ireland (0.101), China (0.092), Sweden (0.079), Armenia (0.055), Bulgaria (0.051), Venezuela (0.045), Kyrgyzstan (0.044). Income levels are defined by GDP per capita (in PPPs constant international US dollars) relative to thaty of the USA in 1993: low income (more than ten times lower), lowermiddle income (more than five and less than ten times lower), upper-middle income (more than two and a half times and less than five times lower), high income (less than two and a half times lower).
The robustness of the above estimates was also tested by including dummies for various country groups or regions, reflecting the possibility of omitted variables of a group or region specific nature such as, for instance, possible benefits (or problems) encountered by oil-exporting countries or the "transition" problems experienced by the former centrally planned countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Results from some of these tests are included in the appendix (see annex table A3). In general the results reported above were found to be robust to such tests. However, when a full set of continent dummies was included, the significance of the technology variable declined, indicating, perhaps, that changes in technological competitiveness tend to be regionally clustered. We also carried out a test with a different version of the indicator for capacity competitiveness, substituting computers (for which some observations were lacking and had to be estimated) with telephones (for which we had complete coverage). Results were again broadly similar.
To illustrate the implications of these estimates for different country groupings, we decomposed the estimated growth of GDP (relative to the average of the sample) for eight different country groups into its constituent parts (as explained by the estimated model and the relevant data). Table 2 ranks the eight country groups after their initial GDP per capita, from the highest to lowest. As is evident from the table, the model captures most of the qualitative features, although the explanatory power is not perfect, especially not for the poorer countries.
13 The model correctly predicts that the rich countries should be expected to grow relatively slowly , mainly as a consequence of a lack of diffusion potential and the failure to increase technology and capacity competitiveness sufficiently to make up for this loss. The prediction is also reasonable for the Asian tigers, whose relatively rapid growth is accounted for by growing technology, capacity and demand competitiveness. The growth of the new EU members is also relatively well explained, with a relatively healthy growth in capacity competitiveness as the main factor on the positive side. This contrasts with the performance of the poorer country groupings, all of which suffer from deteriorating capacity competitiveness (relative to the sample average). The poorer economies are also, with the exception of the developing countries in East Asia, hampered by an unfavourable match between production structure and external demand (which tends to favour the Asian tigers and other advanced economies). Price competitiveness is generally of less significance, except in the case of the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, whose generally negative performance is greatly compounded by very rapidly increasing labour costs per produced unit relative to other countries. 
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to empirically scrutinize why some countries consistently outperform others. Our search was guided by a theoretical perspective that places emphasis on the role played by four different aspects of competitiveness: technology, capacity, cost and demand. The contribution of the paper is particularly to highlight the two first aspects, which often tend to get lost because of measurement problems.
Our empirical analysis, based on a sample of 100 countries between 1993 and 2002, demonstrated the relevance of both technology and capacity competitiveness. The former is one of the main explanations behind the continuing good growth performance of the Asian tigers relative to other major country groups. Deteriorating capacity competitiveness, on the other hand, is, together with an unfavourable export structure, the main factor hampering low income countries in Europe (the formerly centrally planned economies in particular), Asia and Africa in exploiting the potential for catch up in technology and income.
What are the crucial factors behind these developments, and what can governments do in order to improve the relative position of their economies? To better deal with these questions we illustrate in Figure 6 the factors behind the observed changes over time in technology and capacity competitiveness. The differences across country groups are striking.
As for technology competitiveness, there is a clear divide between the advanced countries, with healthy and continuing increases, and the rest of the world, which are stagnant at best with a partial exception for East Asia. The Asian tigers stand out with the best performance. A divide of a different sort is clearly visible along the capacity dimension. In this case there actually is some catch up along one dimension, human capital, particularly by the new EU members, but also for other developing countries. This, however, is more than counteracted by an increasing digital divide (ICT infrastructure), caused by much faster diffusion of computers in the already developed economies and among the Asian tigers than elsewhere. These trends point to the possibility of continuing divergence in the world economy, as emphasized also by other recent studies (see Fagerberg and Verspagen 2002) . However, at any time some countries manage to defy the trend, as the Asian tigers indeed have done in the latter half of the post Second World War period (and Japan before them). In our sample it is the group of the former centrally planned economies that joined the EU in May 2004 that appear to have the best chance in that respect, but there are also many low-income countries that grow fast (and may eventually catch up if this trend continues). These favourable prospects contrast with those of a number of other former centrally planned economies, which appear to witness deteriorating competitiveness along all our four dimensions. Clearly, if these countries are ever going to catch up, they will have to find ways to break this vicious circle. Although many low-income countries are growing fast, this growth has to a large extent been based on exploiting the diffusion potential through a low cost strategy, and there is a danger that some of these countries may soon find themselves constrained by lagging technology and capacity competitiveness. Although the selected indicators have broad coverage compared to alternative measures, in some cases there were missing values that had to be dealt with. We estimated missing data for R&D expenditure in 25 countries and for computers in 13 countries. The estimation method was simple OLS regression (with intercept and squared terms) on pooled levels of related factors with high explanatory power. We regressed R&D expenditure on the two other components of the technology composite indicator (adjusted R 2 = 0.82, F-test = 165.66, all terms significant at 1% level except squared S&T articles at 20%). The number of personal computers per capita was regressed on fixed line and mobile phone subscribers per capita (adjusted R 2 = 0.77, F-test = 293.61, all terms significant at 1% level except the intercept). ). The coverage of educational data was particularly weak in recent years (in all WDI, UNESCO and USAID databases) due to a recent change of methodology (change from ISCED 76 to ISCED 97). The World Bank Aggregate Governance Indicators database is available only biannually between 1996 and 2002.
Principal component analysis (PCA) was carried out on pooled levels of the sub-indicators in 1993 and 2002 (see annex table A2). The PCA indicated a single principal component (eigenvalue > 1) for both technology and capacity composites. The acquired weights (factor scores) were then used to combine the sub-indicators into a composite variable for the initial and final year. Differences between the composite variable in the final and initial year were calculated and used in the regression analysis. The PCA was carried out only on countries with full data availability (before the estimated data for GERD and computers were included).
We used unit labour costs (ULC) in manufacturing expressed in common currency (US dollars) as a measure of price or cost competitiveness. This indicator was dependent upon data availability defined either as the ratio of total wages to value added or as monthly wages of employees divided by value added per worker. The OECD STAN Indicators Database and Eurostat AMECO Database were used as the main sources of value added, employment and wages for its member and candidate countries, while the UNIDO, WDI and ILO LABORSTA databases were used for the remaining countries. Special adjustments had to be made for transition countries, especially the members of the former Soviet Union, which did not have fully convertible exchange rates at the beginning of the period (the initial year is 1994 for Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine, and it has to be moved to 1995 for Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan). Similar considerations apply for a few developing countries with abrupt exchange rates fluctuations between 1992 and 1994.
The indicator for demand competitiveness is calculated using data from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (which is based on the United Nations COMTRADE Database) at the 3-digit level (SITC Rev.3) over the period 1993-2001. Note: See note to table 1. The remaining regional dummies were not significant at the conventional levels. Oil & gas exports is defined as share of commodity groups 333, 334, 335 and 341 (SITC, Rev. 3) in total exports in 1993. Dummy for oil & gas exporters, defined as a country with more than 50% share of these commodity groups in exports, was not significant either. Note that the "demand competitiveness" variable is computed without oil & gas. 
